Introduction
Empirical models of competition are built around a demand and a price equation. The price equation shows that prices are determined as a mark-up on marginal costs that depends on the toughness of competition. These models are normally used to measure competition in an industry in one moment of time, to determine if competition has varied after some structural change, to identify price wars, etc.
In these models, marginal costs are represented by a more or less well de…ned cost function that assumes that …rms are e¢cient and treat observed costs as exogenous. This is in contradiction with a long tradition of empirical literature related to the measurement of e¢ciency through the estimation of production and cost functions (see Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000) . In particular, cost function speci…cations include an error term with two components independent of each other: a symmetric component that measures random variations of the frontier across …rms and captures the e¤ects of measurement error, other statistical noise and random shocks outside the …rm's control, and a one-sided component that captures the e¤ect of global ine¢ciency relative to the stochastic frontier. Note that the so-called global ine¢ciency includes pure technical ine¢ciency that is exogenous to the actions of the …rm as well as endogenous cost-reducing activities.
Moreover, it is worth noting that a more recent literature on incentives and informational asymmetries has proposed a theoretical framework in order to account for the e¤ect of cost-reducing actions of the …rm and has, therefore, shed new light on costs endogeneity. The new theory of regulation (See La¤ont, 1994) suggests that the producer's endogenous e¤ort closely depends on the 2 constraints exerted by the regulatory environment it faces. Empirical works on this latter topic have not been numerous so far. 1 These two elements, technical ine¢ciency and e¤ort, are of particular importance when comparing industries sub ject to di¤erent incentives, or changes in …rms' behavior after a structural change in the rules governing the market.
Exogenous di¤erences among markets or shocks that can change the incentives to compete in one market can be related to regulation, competition policy or international trade policy. This is the case of the European airline industry. At the beginning of the eighties, European aviation was regulated by restrictive bilateral air service agreements between the countries concerned. Each route was served by the two national ‡ag carriers that used to jointly set a single price and evenly split the demand. In the absence of entry, and with price and capacity agreements, competition was not possible and a lack of incentives to improve e¢ciency characterized the industry. This situation allowed …rms, in many cases subsidized by their governments, to increase costs ine¢ciently.
Several authors have attempted to account for cost endogeneity problems during this period. Among them, Neven and Röller (1996) and Neven, Röller and Zhang (2001) develop a competition model where …rms face workers unions and market pressures that may a¤ect operating costs. They apply this model to the European airline industry for the regulated period, and show that the model that accounts for costs endogeneity supports a more competitive result than the standard one. Additionally, Ng and Seabright (2001) use a panel of 1 See Dalen and Gomez-Lobo (2003) and Ivaldi (2002a and 2002b) for an analysis of alternative regulatory mechanisms applied to Norwegian and French urban transport networks.
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European and American carriers from 1982 to 1995 and a reduced cost-form in order to show that state ownership substantially leads to higher operating costs.
Under the pressure of the US "Open skies" policy that started in 1978, several changes took place in the European market. First, some governments started renegotiating their intra-European bilateral agreements. In 1984, the UK and the Netherlands signed the …rst liberal bilateral agreement, that in 1985 was complemented with further deregulatory measures. Subsequently, some other governments signed similar liberal bilateral agreements, e.g. UK-West Germany (1985) , UK-Belgium (1985) and UK-Ireland (1986) In this paper we analyze the impact of the liberalization process on European airline companies' e¢ciency and competition. To achieve this goal, we construct and estimate a model of competition where airlines decide on cost reducing e¤ort. The model includes a system of several equations that accounts for the demand, the capacity constraint that relates the supply of the service to consumers' demand, and the technology of each transport operator. Technology is described through a cost function that includes two non-observable parameters, namely the exogenous technical ine¢ciency faced by each …rm and a cost reducing e¤ort. Cost reducing e¤ort can be expressed by taking into account the regulatory constraints impinging on the activity of each carrier. We are thus able to de…ne a particular cost structure for each type of regulatory regime.
The objective of our work is threefold. First, using a non-nested procedure, we test several scenarios of incentive pressures against each other in order to identify the one that …ts better the data. We show that cost reducing e¤ort has increased signi…cantly only after the introduction of the last E.U. package of deregulatory measures in 1993, since the liberal bilateral agreements had limited e¤ects and the 1987 package of deregulatory measures had no e¤ect on …rms' behavior. Second, we compare our results with those that had been obtained from a standard model with no endogenous e¤ort and/or no exogenous 5 ine¢ciency. It is shown that they are signi…cantly di¤erent from each other and that a model accounting for technical ine¢ciency and e¤ort is always preferred. Third, provided with these results, a price equation is determined and our estimates on competition are tested against a Nash behavior hypothesis.
The results show that the standard model would undermeasure toughness of competition.
Thus, our aim in this paper is to show that a proper modelization of the incentives provided by regulatory pressures allows a better evaluation of competitive forces. The next section presents the cost, supply, and demand systems under consideration in the model. Section 3 focuses on the construction of the endogenous cost function, that depends on the state of the regulation. Functional forms, the estimation procedure, and the empirical results associated to the cost function are developed in Section 4. Section 5 is dedicated to the evaluation of competitive forces in the industry, which entails determining the pricing rules set by European carriers. Section 6 concludes.
Determining the ingredients of the model
In what follows we specify a model for airlines' behavior that encompasses situations of fully regulated as well as liberalized competitive markets. We are concerned with the e¤ect of liberalization on market competition and …rms' ef…ciency and the interconnection between these two decisions. Accordingly, in the context of our model, airlines decide simultaneously about their cost reducing e¤ort and their pricing policy.
A modelling approach followed by several authors consists in assuming that 6 …rms make individual decisions for each route they serve. 4 This approach allows for route speci…c policies. The advantage of this is that it takes into account route characteristics that may a¤ect …rms' behavior, such as the number and identity of the competitors or the length and density of the route. An alternative approach followed in previous contributions assumes that companies take corporate decisions that a¤ect their entire network. 5
Leaving aside reasons related to data availability, we believe that the second approach is more appropriate for our purposes. Airlines serve a large number of interconnected routes that form a network. Sometimes consumers buy a company's service in one single route (what is known as a direct ‡ight) but very often they buy sets of (normally two or three) interconnected routes (indirect ‡ights through one or two hubs). Additionally, when buying a ticket in an individual route, frequent consumers take into account the company's network size and characteristics since this a¤ects the ‡exibility to make further interconnections if needed, exchange tickets, take alternative routes and even enjoy frequent ‡yer prizes and discounts. In other words, scope economies among routes and network e¤ects (almost) impose a common policy to all the routes served by a given carrier. Our aim is to test whether the di¤erent waves of deregulation that a¤ected the European market had a signi…cant impact on the global cost reducing behavior of carriers. Whether the operator should …nd appropriate and e¢cient solutions to solve potential con ‡icts, to improve the training of its employees, or to reorganize its productive structure are decisions that are worth considering at the network level.
Costs
In the short run, …rms are endowed with a given technology that is determined by the quantity and quality of capital installed, as well as a network, determined by the previous history. In order to provide a given amount of service, Q i , a carrier must buy variable inputs, namely, labor, L i and materials, M i , which productivity depends on installed capital, K i , and network exogenous characteristics, z i . The production process and its underlying technology can be implemented through a short-run dual cost function. Denoting by w L and w M the price of labor and materials, the program of the …rm can be translated into the following terms:
where t is a trend, and ½ is a vector of parameters denoting technology.
Note that C i are observed operating costs (which are di¤erent from e¢cient operating costs), µ and e denote …rms' individual ine¢ciency beyond the control of the …rm, and e¤ort, two parameters that are unobservable. Thus, it is 6 It might be usefull to note at this stage that the ine¢ciency term µ should be viewed as a measure of relative ine¢ciency rather than absolute ine¢ciency. A measure of absolute ine¢ciency includes a component that can be explained by exogenous factors that may be captured by various explanatory variables (for instance, the size of the network and the average stage lenght de…ned in the following sections). Hence, the parameter µ should be rather considered as the unobservable part of the absolute ine¢ciency, not captured by the explanatory variables.
8 assumed that technical ine¢ciency prevents the …rm from reaching the required output level Q i , and this may result in upward distorted costs. Cost reducing e¤ort can be undertaken by managers to counterbalance the e¤ect of ine¢ciency.
For instance, managers may spend time and e¤ort in improving the location of inputs within the network, monitoring employees, solving potential con ‡icts, etc. The associated short-run cost function, conditional on capital installed, ine¢ciency and e¤ort is
where¯is a vector of parameters to be estimated. Assume moreover that cost reducing e¤ort involves some internal cost or disutility that can be represented through a convex function ª(e i ; ¹). Cost reducing e¤ort is endogenous and depends on the regulatory constraint impinging on the activity of the airline carrier.
Capacity
Before moving on to the demand side, we should notice that in transit industries, costs and revenues are driven by two di¤erent measures of output. Costs are determined by capacity supplied, i.e., available seat-kilometers, that in turn, depends on ‡eet capacity (measured by the number of seats available), and total mileage performed by the airplanes. However, available seat-kilometers are only an intermediate output that is used by consumers to produce the …nal output, revenue passenger-kilometers (see Berechman, 1993) . This …nal output, q i , determines carriers' revenues. Still, capacity and demand are closely related by a function that may change with time, t, with the technology available,
where¸is a vector of parameters.
Demand
On the demand side, …rm i's demand depends on own and competitors price, 
where ® is a vector of parameters.
Next, we need to de…ne the structure of the system made of Equations (1)- (3). This entails describing carefully the decisions made by the airline carriers, namely cost reducing e¤ort and pricing. Before entering into the analysis, it is worth reminding that the pricing structure itself is independent of the nature of the regulatory pressures impinging on the activity of the …rm.
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For this 7 The particular structure we use to incorporate technical ine¢ciency and e¤ort parameters reason, incentive e¤ects and pricing by …rms can be presented separately. Although prices and e¤ort are determined simultaneously in the decision process, we choose such an approach for ease of exposition.
Regulatory rules and costs
This section focuses on the construction of the structural cost function. During the second half of the eighties, the European airline industry has switched from bilateral air service agreements to more competitive markets. This might have in ‡uenced cost reducing activities. We propose to account for these regulatory pressures through the cost function (1) that is conditional on the cost reducing parameter e: Deriving the equilibrium level of e and plugging it back into the primal cost expression allows us to account for endogenous e¤ort and derive a structural cost form that can be estimated. The aim of such an approach is twofold. First, di¤erent scenarios associated to the di¤erent waves of market deregulation can be tested against each other in order to …gure out what measures had signi…cant e¤ects on the behavior of European airline carriers in terms of cost reduction. Second, accounting for changes in regulation through the cost structure enables us to reduce the source of mispeci…cation, which in turn, should avoid bias in the estimation of the technological parameters. This will allow us to assess in a more satisfactory way the impact of regulatory constraints on the degree of competition of the industry.
Any …rm that is residual claimant for cost savings is willing to provide e¤ort allows the incentive-pricing dichotomy principle to hold. (See La¤ont and Tirole, 1993) . It means that the same pricing formula applies whether we assume strong or soft regulatory pressures.
e in order to reduce its operating costs, C i , in a signi…cant manner. Since the cost reduction activity is costly, the …rm sets the optimal e¤ort level e that maximizes its pro…t ¼ i . Denoting by p i the price of the service to be sold, the pro…t is simply de…ned as the di¤erence between revenue R i = q i (¢)p i and total cost TC = C i (e i ; :) + ª(e i ;:). The program of the …rm is
Note that since revenue R i is independent of e¤ort e, this program is equivalent to the one where the …rm sets the optimal e¤ort level e that minimizes T C. The …rst order condition of this program is
which implies that the optimal e¤ort level equalizes marginal cost savings and the marginal disutility of e¤ort.
On the other hand, a …rm that is not residual claimant for cost reductions has no incentives to provide costly e¤ort. Therefore the optimal e¤ort of a non-residual claimant …rm is supposed to be equal to 0.
Before deregulation, European airline carriers were mainly public entities regulated by bilateral service agreements. Subsidies would generally allow these …rms to completely cover costs. It is therefore assumed that before deregulation, any operator would behave as a non-residual claimant …rm and would not provide any e¤ort at all. Denote by e R such an e¤ort level. After deregulation, as already mentioned, the new competitive pressure as well as the abandon of subsidizing practices would provide the operating …rms with perfect incentives for cost and ine¢ciency reduction. We consider then that the optimal e¤ort provided by a deregulated …rm is given by the condition (5) and is denoted as e D : Given these two e¤ort levels, we can write the cost function as
where s denotes the regulatory regime, that can be either regulation, R, or deregulation, D.
Testing the e¤ects of liberalization on costs
The next step consists in proposing speci…c functional forms for the cost and demand functions, as well as the cost reducing e¤ort and the engineering relationship between demand and supply, in order to derive a set of structural equations to be estimated. Using data on the European airline carriers before and after the di¤erent waves of liberalization, we are capable of shedding light on the cost structure that …ts reality the best, i.e., …guring out which package of deregulation had a signi…cant impact on …rms behavior. This section presents the empirical model, as well as the estimation results.
Empirical implementation
We assume a Cobb-Douglas speci…cation for the cost function in (1). This speci…cation retains the main properties desirable for a cost function and provides a su¢ciently precise description of the technology, while remaining tractable for our purpose. 
where ! L i , ! M i , K i and z i denote wages, price of materials, capital installed and network exogenous characteristics that a¤ect the cost function, and t is a trend.
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Additionally, e i represents e¤ort, µ i is the ine¢ciency term, and u ci is an error term. Note that µ is characterized by a density function
, where µ L (µ U resp.) denotes the most e¢cient (ine¢cient resp.) …rm.
For our empirical speci…cation we assume that z i includes measures of airlines' network size, N ET i , and average stage length, ASL i , 1 0
and has the following shape:
With respect to the internal cost of e¤ort and the engineering relationship between demand, q i, and supply, Q i , represented in (2), we assume the following functional forms, 11 9 The data and their construction are described in detail in the Appendix. 1 0 See Marín (1998) and Neven et al. (2001) for discussions on the introduction of these two variables in the cost function and for evidence on their e¤ects on airlines' productivity.
A measure of airport concentration was included in an alternative speci…cation but it turned out to be highly correlated with the size of the network.
1 1 Notice that ª(e i ) is a convex function, with ª(0) = 0, ª 0 (e i ) > 0 and ª 00 (e i ) > 0.
ª(e i ) = exp(¹e i ) ¡ 1; ¹ > 0;
and
respectively, where u Q i is an error term.
The demand equation corresponding to (3) is speci…ed in linear form as
where p i and GCON S i are …rm i's weighted average price, and consumption growth in its home country, as a measure of economic activity, 1 2 p j is an index of the price of all other airlines, t is a time trend and u q i is an error term. Now, using the functional forms for operating cost (7), internal cost of e¤ort (9), and the …rst order condition (5) on e¤ort activity, we are able to express the e¤ort level under both regulation and deregulation periods. Note that the …rst order condition regarding optimal e¤ort under deregulation e D can now be written as
1 2 Some alternative measures of economic activity where included in this expression in either with or without GCONS. The inclusion of several variables was leading to multicolinearity problems. When only one of the variables was included, none provided a better …t that GCONS. Accordingly, we decided to drop alternative variables and leave GCONS only.
D
, as:
while
As predicted by the new theory of regulation, the e¤ort level of the residual claimant …rm increases with µ, i.e., a more ine¢cient carrier needs to be more active in cost reducing activities than a less ine¢cient one in order to reach the same cost level. Note moreover that these carriers are willing to provide lower e¤ort levels when e¤ort is more costly (the cost reducing technology parameter ¹ is greater). Substituting back e D and e R into the primal cost structure (7) allows us to obtain the …nal forms to be estimated C R (¢) and C D (¢) : We therefore obtain
and The cost function to be estimated is then
where » The system of equations formed by (10), (11) and (17) Note that the system is identi…ed and all parameters can be recovered,
given that by homogeneity of degree 1 in input prices,¯1 +¯2 = 1. Tables 1 to 4 provide the results for the econometric model. We emphasize in this section the two main arguments that are discussed in this paper: First, depending on how deregulation is interpreted, di¤erent cost structures can be estimated. Then, a non-nested test helps us to choose the best cost structure in the sense that it is the one that …ts the data the best.
Estimation results
1 3 For more details, the reader should refer to Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000) . Table 2 presents the demand-capacity relationship. Again, the coe¢cients are signi…cant and have the expected sign. In both cases, the overall …t of the regression is satisfactory.
The main interest of these two equations is to provide instruments for capacity and demand. 2) …rms do not make any e¤ort to reduce ine¢ciency after the introduction of deregulatory measures, i.e., the e¤ect of deregulation is not accounted for, 3) deregulation a¤ects …rms' behavior after the third E.U. package of measures in 1992, and 4) deregulation a¤ects the behavior of the …rms a¤ected by the introduction of liberal bilateral agreements, which are British Airways, KLM, Lufthansa, and Sabena, after 1985, and the remaining companies in 1993.
14 The comparison of scenarios (3) and (4) Additionally, running a maximum likelihood test, it was not possible to reject the model without capital against a model including it at any sensible con…dence level. 16 Moreover, scenarios (3') and (4') cannot be estimated due to convergence problems with the coe¢cient ¹. This indicates that the models are clearly mispeci…ed, suggesting that the deregulatory measures included in the …rst E.U. package had no e¤ect on …rms' behavior, probably due to their limited scope. This result is consistent with Ng and Seabright (2001) .
For the remaining scenarios, the variables are signi…cant and have the expected sign. Costs are increasing with wages and production. The alternative 1 5 This correlation problem is common to most empirical studies dealing with the estimation of short run costs functions. 1 6 We also estimated a long run cost function where capital was regarded as a variable input.
Accordingly, a measure for the price of capital was computed from the companies' accounting data and included in the cost function. This variable was not signi…cant at any con…dence level.
19
scenarios are tested against each other applying the test of nonnested hypothesis proposed in Vuong (1989) . The test shows that scenario (4) cannot be rejected against scenario (3), but the sign of the test indicates that scenario (3) …ts the data better. This suggests that liberal bilateral agreements had a limited e¤ect on …rms' behavior, probably because they regarded only a reduced number of routes. In addition, the results for scenario (3") are consistent with those for scenario (3).
Scenarios (1) and (2) are rejected against scenario (3), which includes an inef…ciency measure and assumes that deregulation a¤ects …rms' behavior after the introduction of the third E.U. package of deregulatory measures in 1992. Given that scenario (1) represents the standard approach proposed by the literature focusing on oligopolistic competition, its rejection advocates the construction of models including these components and indicates that we have to be cautious when interpreting the results derived from other models. More in particular, rejection of scenario (2) shows the importance of accounting for the e¤ects of deregulation on …rms' technology and ine¢ciency.
One could also compare the results regarding ine¢ciency that had been obtained if a model with no e¤ort had been estimated, i.e., scenario (2), with those obtained with scenario (3). We observe that ine¢ciency had been overestimated for all the companies. The average …rm's ine¢ciency level is 0.212 (0.368 resp.) under scenario (3) (scenario (2) resp.) The two values are signi…cantly di¤erent as measured by a t -test (H0 : µ (2) ¡ µ (3) = 0) whose statistic is equal to 6.646.
Taken together, the two periods of regulation and deregulation allow us to identify the cost reducing activity (i.e., e¤ort) in the model since a di¤erent cost structure (a di¤erent technology) for each period is considered. Hence, the 20 technology and the technical ine¢ciency can be estimated. Once this is done, a precise evaluation of the nature of competition in the industry after deregulation can be obtained in a second step. We turn now to the competitive aspect of our study.
Evaluating competition
Having now the most adequate cost estimates in hands, we are capable of providing measures that characterize the degree of competition in the industry after the introduction of liberalization in 1992. Our results are compared to what would have been obtained if cost endogeneity had not been taken into account.
We de…ne the pricing program of each airline carrier. Again, we need to distinguish the period of state regulation from the period of deregulation during which …rms are set free to choose prices in order to maximize their pro…t. Before deregulation, i.e., when …rms are still state owned and regulated, the maximization program presented in (19) is irrelevant. During this period, prices result from bilateral agreements set by public authorities and are under the control of the …rms only partially. We could think about alternative programs for this period, such as social welfare maximizing or monopoly pricing. This would however go beyond the scope of the paper since our intention is to focus on …rms' competitive practices after deregulation.
In a deregulated environment, provided with the cost and demand functions, each …rm solves the following program,
21 where p i is the optimal price to be chosen.
Accordingly, the …rst order conditions for …rm i are given by
where
The term ¢ i accounts for di¤erences in price elasticities under di¤erent competitive situations. Using the estimates of the cost, capacity and demand system obtained in the previous section, our aim is to evaluate the price-cost margins (expressed in the left-hand side of Equation 19) under the various scenarios under consideration, and test these margins against those that could be obtained if carriers obeyed to a perfect Nash behavior, i.e., when
. Thus, we can …gure out whether di¤erent conclusions can be reached regarding carriers' competitive behavior if di¤erent scenarios are accounted for.
From the expressions of demand (11), capacity (10) and costs (17), the price …rst-order condition (under Nash behavior) can be rewritten as
Through the estimation of the cost function, marginal costs, MC i , can be easily recovered. Putting them together with our estimate of the capacitydemand elasticity¸1, as well as the observed values for supply, demand and prices, we are able to evaluate the weighted price-marginal cost margin, M i , set 22 by each carrier, de…ned as the left-hand side of Equation (20). Table 4 (1) and (3) are signi…cantly di¤erent as shown by a t -test (
whose statistic is equal to 7.802. Second, the companies (denoted by LBA) that pioneered the liberalization process and signed liberal bilateral agreements with other EU countries and the US obtain higher margins, even if these companies face lower marginal costs and propose lower prices.
Using our estimates for the demand equation, note that, as suggested by the right-hand side of Equation (20), Nash behavior would entail an average margin M T N for all the carriers in the sample equal to 1.212. Our price-marginal cost margin values obtained under Scenario (1) and (3) both lie below the Nash- Table   ( 5) shows that neither of the two scenarios entails pure Nash behavior, although scenario (3) supports a more competitive behavior.
It is also worth distinguishing carriers that pioneered the liberalization process during the eighties (those labelled LBA) and those that switched to a competitive market after 1992. (1) and (3) 
T -tests (H
suggest that neither of the two scenarios predicts Nash behavior for any set of companies. However, the other companies are closer to Nash behavior than the LBA carriers, suggesting that the latter have a more competitive behavior.
Conclusions
The results obtained in this paper have proved fruitful on both methodological and institutional sides. First, it has been shown that a cost-supply-demand structure that accounts for …rms' technical ine¢ciency and cost reducing activities …ts better to the data than the usual model proposed by the literature focusing on oligopolistic competition. Moreover, our application of this methodology to the airlines industry shows that the results obtained under the standard oligopoly model would be seriously biased and could lead to the wrong conclusions about e¢ciency and competition in the industry.
Second, it is suggested that the 1992 European deregulation package introduced a signi…cant change in the behavior of airline carriers regarding e¢ciency improvement. We show that competition has increased signi…cantly only after 1 8 The q=p ratio is more than three times higher on average for the LBA carriers. The variables have been constructed as follows. In the cost function, production, (Q i ), wages (! Li ), capital (K i ) and average stage length (ASL i ) correspond to total operating expenses (ICAO), seat-kilometers available, ‡ight crew salaries and expenses and maintenance and overhaul expenses over number of employees, ‡eet total number of seats, and total aircraft kilometers over total aircraft departures, respectively. With respect to total costs, companies report one single …gure that corresponds to passengers, freight and mail activities.
The distribution of operations among these three activities can vary signi…-cantly among companies. However, it is easy to obtain information on the total number of tonne-Kilometers performed that correspond to passengers (including baggage), freight and mail, respectively. We multiply total costs reported by each company by the share of tones-kilometers performed corresponding to passengers in order to compute our cost variable (C i ). The data needed to construct these variables have been retrieved from di¤erent issues of Note: * T test for differences in either Scenario (1) or (3) sample mean with Nash behavior sample mean.
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